С О Ц И Н Т Е Г Р У М

Однако мне совершенно неясно, каким образом Вы собираетесь использовать закон стоимости.
Дело в том, что для любой системы справедлив универсальный Закон Фишера
MV = PQ ,
где M — номинальная денежная масса, V — скорость обращения денег, P — индекс цен, Q — объём выпуска в постоянных единицах стоимости.
Из записанной формулы следует, что
Темп роста индекса цен равен = Темпу роста денежной массы + Темпу роста скорости обращения денег -- Темп роста объёма выпуска
Где тут закон стоимости?

Дело в том, что для любой системы справедлив универсальный Закон Фишера
MV = PQ ,
где M — номинальная денежная масса, V — скорость обращения денег, P — индекс цен, Q — объём выпуска в постоянных единицах стоимости.

Из записанной формулы следует, что

Темп роста индекса цен равен = Темпу роста денежной массы + Темпу роста скорости обращения денег -- Темп роста объёма выпуска

Где тут закон стоимости?

The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century.

During the decade of the 1590s, the price-revolution entered a new stage—a prolonged and very painful period that historians call the “general crisis of the seventeenth century.” They use that name with good reason. This was the darkest era in European history after the catastrophe of the fourteenth century.The first signs were similar to those of the medieval crisis. During the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the economy of Europe was afflicted by the same cruel combination of rising prices and falling opportunities that neoclassical economists would call “stagflation” in the late twentieth century. The economy of England was a case in point. Historian Barry Supple writes, “the last years of Elizabeth’s reign can no longer be considered as a prosperous era of economic expansion.” He finds evidence of a deep economic depression in the 1580s and 1590s. At the same time, prices of consumables rose even more rapidly than before. Conditions differed in detail throughout Europe, but the general trends were much the same. Real wages and industrial prices were depressed, while the cost of food and fuel climbed higher, and also became highly unstable—rising and falling in sharp surges of increasing amplitude.

The real wages of artisans and laborers fell farther behind the cost of living, while returns to land and capital continued to advance. Wealth became increasingly concentrated in a few hands. That tendency engendered Francis Bacon’s epigram: “Money is like muck, not good except it be spread around.” But the wealth of Europe was not spread around in the late sixteenth century. The rich grew richer, while increasing numbers of the poor were driven very near the edge of starvation. As these very dangerous trends continued, the western world experienced a major disaster. In 1591, the weather turned wet and cold. European peasants watched helplessly as their wheat and rye were beaten down in the fields, and their hay crops rotted in the meadows. The same thing happened the next year, and the year after that, and altogether seven years running. In France, the wine harvest was late and small from 1591 to 1597. Grain crops fared even worse. English historian W. G. Hoskins observed, “the 1594 harvest was bad; 1595 was even worse; 1596 was a disaster; 1597 was bad too.”
This was more than merely a short spell of bad weather. It was a shift in the climate—one of several sharp downturns in the early modern era that have been called collectively the “little ice age.” The decade of the 1590s was so cold that Alpine glaciers began to send rivers of ice through inhabited valleys. In 1595 the Giétroz glacier buried the villages of Martigny and killed seventy people. Disasters of the same sort happened at Grindelwald and Chamonix and the Val d’Aosta.

Similar events had happened before, but in the 1590s they came at a time when the economy was dangerously overstrained. Families had little in reserve. Food riots broke out in many parts of Europe. As the troubles continued, people began to starve. A season of scarcity grew into a massive famine that was called the “great dearth.” There were terrible scenes of suffering in many parts of Europe. A Swede wrote in 1597: People ground and chopped many unsuitable things into bread such as mash, chaff, bark, buds, nettles, hay, straw, peat moss, nutshells, peastalks, etc. This made people so weak and their bodies so swollen that innumerable people died. Many widows, too, were found dead on the ground with red hummock grass, seeds which grew in the fields, and other kinds of grass in their mouths. People were found dead in the houses, under barns, in the ovens of bath houses and wherever they had been able to squeeze in, so that, God knows, there was enough to do getting them to the graveyard, though the dogs ate many of the corpses. Children starved to death at their mothers’ breast, for they had nothing to give them suck.
Similar scenes were described in England, Scotland, France, Germany, Scandinavia, Hungary, Russia and Spain. The great dearth fell cruelly upon the poor, while the rich remained secure in their plenty. In London’s affluent central neighborhoods, the number of burials increased very little during these years; but outlying parishes inhabited by the poor suffered severely. The effect of scarcity was to deepen the material inequalities that were already very great in European culture, and to contribute to growing social instability. Another consequence of scarcity was an increase in crime. The pattern was much the same as in the fourteenth century. When the price of food surged, crime increased sharply. When prices fell, criminal acts declined. This correlation was very strong in the later stages of every price-revolution from the Middle Ages to our own time.

These troubles were compounded by the growth of disease. During the great dearth many parts of Europe reported much trouble with the “bloody flux.” This was perhaps not dysentery as many have surmised; similar symptoms are caused by malnutrition. Soon other epidemic diseases spread swiftly through a weakened population. The plague returned to Europe, ravaging its cities and many parts of the countryside. One of the worst outbreaks was the Cantabrian Plague, which killed half a million people in Iberia from 1597 to 1602, then spread to England and other parts of Europe. As in the fourteenth century, plague did not strike a single blow. It returned again and again, with shattering effect. The region of Angers was an example. In the diocese of Murienne, it was introduced by soldiers returning from a military campaign (a common means of infection). Repeated epidemics followed in 1583–84, 1598, 1626, 1631 and 1639. Of 62 parishes in the diocese, 56 were severely infected. Two parishes (Modane and Aiguebelle) lost more than 40 percent of their inhabitants. In the diocese as a whole, the death rate rose to 80 per thousand—much below the toll of the Black Death in 1348, but twice the normal level.
This was merely one of many epidemic diseases that spread through Europe, which suffered much from visitations of smallpox, diptheria, typhus and other nameless infections. One historian writes that “no century since the fourteenth has a worse record for epidemic
disease.” At the same time that mortality increased, rates of fertility declined. From northern Germany to southern Spain, the number of inhabitants fell sharply after a long period of growth. In the cathedral of Toledo a clergyman named Sancho de Moncado studied his baptismal registers and found that the number of births dropped from the mid-sixteenth century to 1617 by 50 percent. Moncado observed that this decline happened not because of pestilence or migration, but “because the people cannot support themselves,” as a consequence of scarcity and the soaring cost of food.
The combined effect of rising mortality and falling fertility caused a reversal of demographic growth in the seventeenth century. This was the only period after the Black Death when the population of Europe actually declined. As if these sufferings were not enough, a major economic collapse occurred in the period from 1610 to 1622. This was more than merely a cyclical downturn. It was a major break in the secular trend. Historian Ruggiero Romano observed its effects almost everywhere in Europe. In the Baltic, the number of ships passing through the Danish Sound reached its peak near the year 1600, and then after a period of fluctuation declined steadily for more than fifty years. In the Spanish port of Seville, a major entrepot for American trade, the monumental research of Huguette and Pierre Chaunu yielded evidence that total tonnage entering and leaving Seville harbor rose steadily through most of the sixteenth century to a peak in the year 1610; then it fell sharply, and kept on falling for many decades. In Venice, Ragusa, Leghorn and Marseilles, customs duties and anchorage taxes peaked in the early seventeenth century, then declined catastrophically after 1618. In Danzig, the grain trade collapsed after 1619.
In England, Italy and Spain, the sale of wool and textiles peaked in the decade 1610–20, then entered a deep depression that continued for half a century. Even the prosperous Low Countries—an exception to many seventeenth-century trends—were caught in this economic collapse. Industrial production began to decline in Amsterdam and Rotterdam after about 1620.

Famine, pestilence, and economic depression were accompanied by war. During the entire century from 1551 to 1650, peace prevailed throughout the continent only in a single year (1610)—a record unmatched since the fourteenth century. These conflicts were remarkable not only for their frequency but also their ferocity. By far the most destructive was a cluster of religious and political conflicts that historians call the Thirty Years War (1618– 48). This great conflict was a catastrophe for central Europe. Historian Gunther Franz estimates that the population of Germany declined by 40 percent from 1618 to 1648— a larger proportion than were killed by the Black Death. Other scholars think that losses was not so high, but all agree that the human cost of the Thirty Years War was very great. Large sections of middle Europe were laid waste. There was also a brutalization of the spirit in the Thirty Years War; appalling atrocities routinely occurred. Germany was not alone in her suffering. Broad areas of France, England, Scotland, Ireland and the Low Countries were also ravaged by war in this period. Flanders became once again the charnal house of Europe. A few regions escaped the general carnage. Switzerland managed to keep war at bay.

Many of its young men went off to fight and never came home again, but the Swiss republics themselves remained secure in their Alpine redoubts. They were so much the exception that a German visitor in Switzerland wrote, “The country appeared to me so strange . . . as if I had come to Brazil or China. There I saw a people going about their business in peace. . . . Nobody stood in fear of the foe; nobody dreaded pillage, nobody was afraid of losing his property, his limbs or his life.” During the early seventeenth century, the armies of Europe reached their largest size since the Roman era. Their upkeep imposed heavy costs at the same time that public revenues were reduced by the combined effect of famine, pestilence, war, depression, regressive taxation and monetary inflation. They also were put to frequent use in most of Europe. War became highly destructive of life and wealth and happiness during this period. Historian John Nef writes, “For suspicion and hatred, devastation and hardship, there was to be nothing quite like it again until the twentieth century.”

Needy governments resorted to all the usual forms of fiscal folly. Some tried deficit financing on a large scale. Others systematically debased their coinage. Many tried to wring more taxes from sullen and resentful populations. As governments desperately attempted to increase their revenues, the suffering people of Europe were goaded to acts of violent resistance. The result was an age of revolutions in virtually all European states. Most of these overturnings were caused by fiscal problems. In Iberia, major revolutions broke out in Catalonia and Portugal (1640) when Spanish ministers tried to raise large revenues. In England, an ill-fated attempt by Charles I to obtain more money from his subjects led to fullscale civil war, which ended in the execution of the king himself. In France, a series of rebellions called the Frondes developed from 1648 to 1654, primarily as a result of fiscal disputes between the Parlement of Paris and the Crown. In Naples, the revolt of the fisherman Masaniello occurred after the kingdom had been drained of its wealth by the Spanish government (1647). In Sicily a revolution began at Palermo (1647); its rallying cry was “Long live the King and down with taxes.”13 Denmark experienced a revolution from the right that created an absolutist monarchy in 1660, as a direct consequence of a fiscal crisis.

Even in Switzerland, there was a Peasants’ Revolt (1654), which happened after the government ordered a major depreciation of its currency. The Ukraine had its “Great Ukrainian Revolution” from 1648 to 1654. In Hungary, there was the Durucz movement. The Netherlands experienced a bloodless coup d’état which broke the power of its ruling Stadtholders (1650). Sweden went through a constitutional crisis (1650). The people of Scotland and Ireland suffered a series of bloody rebellions and repressions from 1638 to 1660. Smaller peasant risings also occurred throughout Europe in exceptionally large numbers. In the south of France alone, one historian has counted no fewer than 264 insurrections between 1596 and 1660—a larger number than in any other period of that region’s history. Most were protests against intolerable economic conditions. The general crisis of the seventeenth century left its mark upon the culture of an age. The greatest works of literature, painting, philosophy and theology in this era commonly expressed a mood of increasing pessimism and despair.

After 1601, Shakespeare turned from his Elizabethan comedies and histories to his great tragedies— Hamlet (1600–01), Othello (1604), Macbeth (1605–06), King Lear (1605–06). These works were dark visions of a disordered world that seemed to conspire against human hope and happiness. At the same time, Cervantes produced perhaps the greatest masterpiece of Spanish literature, Don Quixote (1605, 1615), which for all its mordant humor was a sad and bitter description of a world that had dissolved into social chaos. The great painting of the period captured the same themes in different ways—in the demonic fantasies of Pieter Brueghel (1564–1638), the spiritual suffering of El Greco (1548? -1614?), the brooding melancholy of Rembrandt (1606–69), the sensual violence of Rubens (1577–1640), and the bizarre grotesqueries of the Italian mannerists. The philosophy of the period was similar in tone. The leading example was the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), with its organizing assumption that the natural condition of man was “poor and solitary, nasty, brutish and short.”

Another dark vision of the world flowed from the pen of Oxford clergyman Robert Burton (1577–1640), in his treatise on sadness and disappointment called The Anatomy of Melancholy. There were always a few hopeful voices who cried out against despair. This was also the age of Descartes (1596–1650), and his affirmation of enduring values in an unstable world. But Descartes described his intellectual journey as that of “a man who walks alone in the darkness.”

A simple monetarist model, that seeks an explanation of price movements primarily in terms of the quantity of money in circulation, works no better for this period than for any other. New research by Michel Morineau finds evidence that American treasure flowed abundantly into Europe during the period 1660–1730, in quantities almost (but not quite) equal to the price-revolution that preceded it. But this time there was no long-term inflation.

Каюсь, Валерий Васильевич, но от прежних моих попыток понять, проблему трансформации, у меня осталось впечатление, что соответствующая система уравнений содержит больше переменных, чем можно определить из уравнений, и, чтобы получить необходимые соотношения, необходимо наложить какие либо дополнительные требования . И вот исследователи проблемы трансформации ищут условия, при которых искомые соотношения между ценами удалось бы определить. Возможно, Вам, Валерий Васильевич, сопутствовала удача и Вы нашли достаточно общие условия?